Online Attorney

Co. v. South Carolina ex rel. Daniel, 281 U.S. 537 (1930). 205 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 242 U.S. 603, 607 (1917). 206 ‘‘Since the decision in Wisconsin, M. & P.R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U.S. 287 (1900), there can be no doubt of the power of a State, acting through an administrative body, to require railroad companies to make track connections. But manifestly that does not mean that a Commission may compel them to build branch lines, so as to connect roads lying at a distance from each other; nor does it mean that they may be required to make connections at every point where their tracks come close together in city, town and country, regardless of the amount of business to be done, or the number of persons who may utilize the connection if built. The question in each case must be determined in the light of all the facts and with a just regard to the advantage to be derived by the public and the expense to be incurred by the carrier. . . . If the order involves the use of property needed in the discharge of those mary duty of a public utility is to serve all those who desire the service it renders, and so it follows that a company cannot pick and choose to serve only those portions of its territory which it finds most profitable. Therefore, compelling a gas company to continue serving specified cities as long as it continues to do business in other parts of the State does not result in an unconstitutional deprivation. 202 Likewise, requiring a railway to continue the service of a branch or part of a line is acceptable, even if that portion of the operation is an economic drain. 203 A company, however, cannot be compelled to operate its franchise at a loss, but must be at liberty to surrender it and discontinue operations. 204 As the standard for regulation of a utility is whether a particular directive is reasonable, the question of whether a state order requiring the provision of services is reasonable could include a consideration of the likelihood of pecuniary loss, the nature, extent and productiveness of the carrier’s intrastate business, the character of the service required, the public need for it, and its effect upon service already being rendered. 205 An example of the kind of regulation where the issue of reasonableness would require an evaluation of numerous practical and economic factors is where railroads are required to lay tracks and otherwise provide the required equipment to facilitate the connection of separate track lines. 206 VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 1714 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED duties which the carrier is bound to perform, then, upon proof of the necessity, the order will be granted, even though ‘the furnishing of such necessary facilities may occasion an incidental pecuniary loss.’ . . . Where, however, the proceeding is brought to compel a carrier to furnish a facility not included within its absolute duties, the question of expense is of more controlling importance. In determining the reasonableness of such an order the Court must consider all the facts—the places and persons interested, the volume of business to be affected, the saving in time and expense to the shipper, as against the cost and loss to the carrier.’’ Washington ex rel. Oregon R.R. & Nav. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U.S. 510, 528–29 (1912). See also Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Michigan R.R. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 615 (1915); Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Georgia R.R. Comm’n, 240 U.S. 324, 327 (1916). 207 Due process is not denied when two carriers, who wholly own and dominate a small connecting railroad, are prohibited from exacting higher charges from shippers accepting delivery over said connecting road than are collected from shippers taking delivery at the terminals of said carriers. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic Ass’n, 247 U.S. 490 (1918). Nor are railroads denied due process when they are forbidden to exact a greater charge for a shorter distance than for a longer distance. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Kentucky, 183 U.S. 503, 512 (1902); Missouri Pacific Ry. v. McGrew Coal Co., 244 U.S. 191 (1917). Nor is it ‘‘unreasonable’’ or ‘‘arbitrary’’ to require a railroad to desist from demanding advance payment on merchandise received from one carrier while it accepts merchandise of the same character at the same point from another carrier without such prepayment. Wadley Southern Ry. v. Georgia, 235 U.S. 651 (1915). 208 Although a carrier is under a duty to accept goods tendered at its station, it cannot be required, upon payment simply for the service of carriage, to accept cars offered at an arbitrary connection point near its terminus by a competing road seeking to reach and use the former’s terminal facilities. Nor may a carrier be required to deliver its cars to connecting carriers without adequate protection from loss or undue detention or compensation for their use. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Stock Yards Co., 212 U.S. 132 (1909). But a carrier may be compelled to interchange its freight cars with other carriers under reasonable terms, Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Michigan R.R. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 615 (1915), and to accept cars already loaded and in suitable condition. for reshipment over its lines to points within the State. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Iowa, 233 U.S. 334 (1914). 209 The following cases all concern the operation of railroads: Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 96 U.S. 521 (1878) (prohibition against operation on certain streets); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914) (restrictions on speed and operations in business sections); Great Northern Ry. v. Minnesota ex rel. Clara City, 246 U.S. 434 (1918) (restrictions on speed and operations in business section) Denver & R.G. R.R. v. Denver, 250 U.S. 241 (1919) (or removal of a track crossing at a thoroughfare); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. White, 278 U.S. 456 (1929) (compelling the presence of a flagman at a crossing notwithstanding that automatic devices might be cheaper and better); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Alabama, 128 U.S. 96 (1888) (compulsory examination of employees for color blindness); Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911) (full crews on certain trains); St. Louis I. Mt. & So. Ry. v. Arkansas, 240 U.S. 518 (1916) (same); Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249 (1931) (same); Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 393 U.S. 129 (1968) (same); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280 (1914) (specification of a type of locomotive headlight ); Erie R.R. v. Solomon, 237 U.S. 427 (1915) (safety appliance regulations); New York, N.H. and H.R.R. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628 (1897) (prohibition on the heating of passenger cars from stoves or furnaces inside or suspended from the cars). Generally, regulation of a utility’s service to commercial customers attracts less scrutiny 207 than regulations intended to facilitate the operations of a competitor, 208 and governmental power to regulate in the interest of safety has long been conceded. 209 Requirements for service having no substantial relation to a utility’s VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED 1715 210 Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R. v. Wisconsin, 238 U.S. 491 (1915). 211 Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35 (1922). See also Yazoo & Miss. V.R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912); cf. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913). 212 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Glenn, 239 U.S. 388 (1915). 213 St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1 (1897). 214 Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35 (1922) (penalty imposed if claimant subsequently obtained by suit more than the amount tendered by the railroad). But see Kansas City Ry. v. Anderson, 233 U.S. 325 (1914) (levying double damages and an attorney’s fee upon a railroad for failure to pay damage claims only where the plaintiff had not demanded more than he recovered in court); St. Louis, I. Mt. & So. Ry. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 354 (1912) (same); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165 (1914) (same). 215 Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340 (1913). regulated function, however, have been voided, such as requiring railroads to maintain scales to facilitate trading in cattle, or a prohibiting letting down an unoccupied upper berth on a rail car while the lower berth was occupied. 210 Imposition of Statutory Liabilities and Penalties Upon Common Carriers.—Legislators have considerable latitude to impose legal burdens upon common carriers, as long as the carriers are not precluded from shifting such burdens. Thus, a statute may make an initial rail carrier, 211 or the connecting or delivering carrier, 212 liable to the shipper for the nondelivery of goods which results from the fault of another, as long as the carrier has a subrogated right to proceed against the carrier at fault. Similarly, a railroad may be held responsible for damages to the owner of property injured by fire caused by locomotive engines, as the statute also granted the railroad an insurable interest in such property along its route, allowing the railroad to procure insurance against such liability. 213 Equally consistent with the requirements of due process are enactments imposing on all common carriers a penalty for failure to settle claims for freight lost or damaged in shipment within a reasonable specified period. 214 The Court has, however, established some limits on the imposition of penalties on common carriers. During the Lochner era, the Court invalidated an award of $500 in liquidated damages plus reasonable attorney’s fees imposed on a carrier that had collected transportation charges in excess of established maximum rates as disproportionate. The Court also noted that the penalty was exacted under conditions not affording the carrier an adequate opportunity to test the constitutionality of the rates before liability attached. 215 Where the carrier did have an opportunity to challenge the reasonableness of the rate, however, the Court indicated that the validity of the penalty imposed need not be determined by comparison with the amount of the overcharge. Inasmuch as a penalty is imposed as punishment for violation of law, the legislature may VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 1716 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED 216 In accordance with this standard, a statute granting an aggrieved passenger (who recovered $100 for an overcharge of 60 cents) the right to recover in a civil suit not less than $50 nor more than $300 plus costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee was upheld. St. Louis, I. Mt. & So. Ry. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919). See also Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512 (1885) (statute requiring railroads to erect and maintain fences and cattle guards subject to award of double damages for failure to so maintain them upheld); Minneapolis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889) (same); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Cram, 228 U.S. 70 (1913) (required payment of $10 per car per hour to owner of livestock for failure to meet minimum rate of speed for delivery upheld). But see Southwestern Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482 (1915) (fine of $3,600 imposed on a telephone company for suspending service of patron in arrears in accordance with established and uncontested regulations struck down as arbitrary and oppressive). 217 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 527–28 (1934). See also New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 106–08 (1978) (upholding regulation of franchise relationship). 218 New Orleans Debenture Redemption Co. v. Louisiana, 180 U.S. 320 (1901). 219 National Council U.A.M. v. State Council, 203 U.S. 151, 162–63 (1906). adjust its amount to the public wrong rather than the private injury, and the only limitation which the Fourteenth Amendment imposes is that the penalty prescribed shall not be ‘‘so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportionate to the offense and obviously unreasonable.’’ 216 Regulation of Businesses, Corporations, Professions, and Trades Generally.—States may impose significant regulations on businesses without violating due process. ‘‘The Constitution does not guarantee the unrestricted privilege to engage in a business or to conduct it as one pleases. Certain kinds of business may be prohibited; and the right to conduct a business, or to pursue a calling, may be conditioned. . . . Statutes prescribing the terms upon which those conducting certain businesses may contract, or imposing terms if they do enter into agreements, are within the State’s competency.’’ 217 Still, the fact the State reserves the power to amend or repeal corporate charters does not support the taking of corporate property without due process of law, as termination of the corporate structure merely results in turning over corporate property to the stockholders after liquidation. 218 Foreign (out-of-state) corporations also enjoy the protection under the due process clauses, but this does not grant them an unconditional right to enter another State or to continue to do business therein. Language in some early cases suggested that States had plenary power to exclude or to expel a foreign corporation. 219 This power is clearly limited by the modern doctrine of the ‘‘negative’’ commerce clause, which constrains states’ authority to discriminate against foreign corporations in favor of local commerce. Still, it has always been acknowledged that states may subject cor- VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED 1717 220 Munday v. Wisconsin Trust Co., 252 U.S. 499 (1920). 221 State Farm Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154 (1945). 222 Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). Similarly a statute requiring a foreign hospital corporation to dispose of farm land not necessary to the conduct of their business was invalid even though the hospital, because of changed economic conditions, was unable to recoup its original investment from the sale. New Orleans Debenture Redemption Co. v. Louisiana, 180 U.S. 320 (1901). 223 See, e.g., Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U.S. 433 (1910) (statute prohibiting retail lumber dealers from agreeing not to purchase materials from wholesalers selling directly to consumers in the retailers’ localities upheld); Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904) (law punishing combinations for ‘‘maliciously’’ injuring a rival in the same business, profession, or trade upheld). 224 Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447 (1905). See Waters Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909); National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115 (1905), also upholding antitrust laws. 225 International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199 (1914). See also American Machine Co. v. Kentucky, 236 U.S. 660 (1915). 226 Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157 (1912) (prohibition on intentionally destroying competition of a rival business by making sales at a lower rate, after considering distance, in one section of the State than in another upheld). But cf. Fairmont Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927) (invalidating on liberty of contract grounds similar statute punishing dealers in cream who pay higher prices in one locality than in another, the Court finding no reasonable relation between the statute’s sanctions and the anticipated evil). 227 Old Dearborn Co. v. Seagram Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936) (prohibition of contracts requiring that commodities identified by trademark will not be sold by the vendee or subsequent vendees except at prices stipulated by the original vendor upheld); Pep Boys v. Pyroil, 299 U.S. 198 (1936) (same); Safeway Stores v. Oklaporate entry or continued operation to reasonable, non-discriminatory conditions. Thus, for instance, a state law which requires the filing of articles with a local official as a prerequisite to the validity of conveyances of local realty to such corporations is not violative of due process. 220 Or, statutes which require a foreign insurance company to maintain reserves computed by a specific percentage of premiums (including membership fees) received in all States, 221 or to consent to direct actions filed against it by persons injured in the host State are valid. 222 Laws Prohibiting Trusts, Restraint of Trade or Fraud.— Even during the period when the Court was invalidating statutes under liberty of contract principles, it recognized the right of states to prohibit combinations in restraint of trade. 223 Thus, states could prohibit agreements to pool and fix prices, divide net earnings, and prevent competition in the purchase and sale of grain. 224 Further, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not preclude a State from adopting a policy prohibiting competing corporations from combinations, even when such combinations were induced by good intentions and from which benefit and no injury have resulted. 225 The Court also upheld a variety of statutes prohibiting activities taken by individual businesses intended to harm competitors 226 or restrain the trade of others. 227 VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 1718 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED homa Grocers, 360 U.S. 334 (1959) (application of an unfair sales act to enjoin a retail grocery company from selling below statutory cost upheld, even though competitors were selling at unlawful prices, as there is no constitutional right to employ retaliation against action outlawed by a State and appellant could enjoin illegal activity of its competitors) 228 Schmidinger v. City of Chicago, 226 U.S. 578, 588 (1913) (citing McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 550 (1909)). See Hauge v. City of Chicago, 299 U.S. 387 (1937) (municipal ordinance requiring that commodities sold by weight be weighed by a public weighmaster within the city valid even as applied to one delivering coal from state-tested scales at a mine outside the city); Lemieux v. Young, 211 U.S. 489 (1909) (statute requiring merchants to record sales in bulk not made sin the regular course of business valid)); Kidd, Dater Co. v. Musselman Grocer Co., 217 U.S. 461 (1910) (same). 229 Merchants Exchange v. Missouri, 248 U.S. 365 (1919). 230 Pacific States Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935) (administrative order prescribing the dimensions, form, and capacity of containers for strawberries and raspberries is not arbitrary as the form and dimensions bore a reasonable relation to the protection of the buyers and the preservation in transit of the fruit); Schmidinger v. City of Chicago, 226 U.S. 578 (1913) (ordinance fixing standard sizes is not unconstitutional); Armor & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U.S. 510 (1916) (law that lard not sold in bulk should be put up in containers holding one, three, or five pounds weight, or some whole multiple of these numbers valid); Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U.S. 570 (1934) (regulations which imposed a rate of tolerance for the minimum weight for a loaf of bread upheld); But cf. Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (tolerance of only two ounces in excess of the minimum weight per loaf is unreasonable, given finding that it was impossible to manufacture good bread without frequently exceeding the prescribed tolerance). 231 Heath & Milligan Co. v. Worst, 207 U.S. 338 (1907); Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427 (1919); National Fertilizer Ass’n v. Bradley, 301 U.S. 178 (1937). 232 Advance-Rumely Co. v. Jackson, 287 U.S. 283 (1932). Laws and ordinances tending to prevent frauds by requiring honest weights and measures in the sale of articles of general consumption have long been considered lawful exertions of the police power. 228 Thus, a prohibition on the issuance or sale by other than an authorized weigher of any weight certificate for grain weighed at any warehouse or elevator where state weighers are stationed is not unconstitutional. 229 Similarly, the power of a State to prescribe standard containers to protect buyers from deception as well as to facilitate trading and to preserve the condition of the merchandise is not open to question. 230 A variety of other business regulations which tend to prevent fraud have withstood constitutional scrutiny. Thus, a State may require that the nature of a product be fairly set forth, despite the right of a manufacturer to maintain secrecy as to his compounds. 231 Or, a statute providing that the purchaser of harvesting or threshing machinery for his own use shall have a reasonable time after delivery for inspecting and testing it, and may rescind the contract if the machinery does not prove reasonably adequate, does not violate the due process clause. 232 Further, in the exercise of its power to prevent fraud and imposition, a State may regulate VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED 1719 233 Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917). 234 Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425 (1902). 235 Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606 (1903). 236 Brodnax v. Missouri, 219 U.S. 285 (1911). 237 Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis, 240 U.S. 342 (1916); Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369 (1916); Pitney v. Washington, 240 U.S. 387 (1916). 238 House v. Mayes, 219 U.S. 270 (1911). 239 Doty v. Love, 295 U.S. 64 (1935) (rights of creditors in an insolvent bank not violated by a later statute permitting re-opening under a reorganization plan approved by the court, the liquidating officer, and by three-fourths of the creditors) Farmers Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U.S. 649 (1923) (Federal Reserve bank not unlawfully deprived of business rights of liberty of contract by a law which allows state banks to pay checks in exchange when presented by or through a Federal Reserve bank, post office, or express company and when not made payable otherwise by a maker). 240 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911); Shallenberger v. First State Bank, 219 U.S. 114 (1911); Assaria State Bank v. Dolley, 219 U.S. 121 (1911); Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765 (1931). trading in securities within its borders, require a license of those engaging in such dealing, make issuance of a license dependent on the good repute of the applicants, and permit, subject to judicial review of his findings, revocation of the license. 233 The power to regulate also includes the power to forbid certain business practices. Thus, a State may forbid the giving of options to sell or buy any commodity at a future time 234 It may also forbid sales on margin for future delivery, 235 and may prohibit the keeping of places where stocks, grain, and the like, are sold but not paid for at the time, unless a record of the same be made and a stamp tax paid. 236 A prohibitive license fee upon the use of trading stamps is not unconstitutional, 237 nor is imposing criminal penalties for any deductions by purchasers from the actual weight of grain, hay, seed, or coal purchased, even when such deduction is made under a claim of custom or under a rule of a board of trade. 238 Banking, Wage Assignments and Garnishment.—Regulation of banks and banking has always been considered well within the police power of states, and the Fourteenth Amendment did not eliminate this regulatory authority. 239 A variety of regulations have been upheld over the years. For example, state banks are not deprived of property without due process by a statute subjecting them to assessments for a depositors’ guaranty fund. 240 Also, a law requiring savings banks to turn over deposits inactive for thirty years to the State (when the depositor cannot be found), with provision for payment to the depositor or his heirs on establishment of the right, does not effect an invalid taking of the property of said banks; nor does a statute requiring banks to turn over to the pro- VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 1720 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED 241 Provident Savings Inst. v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660 (1911); Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944). When a bank conservator appointed pursuant to a new statute has all the functions of a receiver under the old law, one of which is the enforcement on behalf of depositors of stockholders’ liability, which liability the conservator can enforce as cheaply as could a receiver appointed under the preexisting statute, it cannot be said that the new statute, in suspending the right of a depositor to have a receiver appointed, arbitrarily deprives a depositor of his remedy or destroys his property without the due process of law. The depositor has no property right in any particular form of remedy. Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326 (1933). 242 Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U.S. 563 (1910). 243 Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225 (1911). 244 La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919); Stipich v. Insurance Co., 277 U.S. 311, 320 (1928). 245 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389 (1914). 246 O’Gorman & Young v. Hartford Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931). 247 Nutting v. Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 553, 556 (1902) (distinguishing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)). See also Hoper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895). 248 Daniel v. Family Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949). tective custody of the State deposits that, depending on the nature of the deposit, have been inactive ten or twenty-five years. 241 A State is acting clearly within its police power in fixing maximum rates of interest on money loaned within its border, and such regulation is within legislative discretion if not unreasonable or arbitrary. 242 Equally valid is a requirement that assignments of future wages as security for debts of less than $200,

Online Attorney