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s of de jure segregation. So long as the remedy is related to the condition found to violate the Constitution, so long as it is remedial, and so long as it takes into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs, federal courts have broad and flexible powers to remedy past wrongs. 1566 The broad scope of federal courts’ remedial powers was more recently reaffirmed in Missouri v. Jenkins. 1567 There the Court ruled that a federal district court has the power to order local authorities to impose a tax increase in order to pay to remedy a constitutional violation, and if necessary may enjoin operation of state laws prohibiting such tax increases. However, the Court also held, the district court had abused its discretion by itself imposing an increase in property taxes without first affording local officials ‘‘the opportunity to devise their own solutions.’’ 1568 Efforts to Curb Busing and Other Desegregation Remedies.— Especially during the 1970s, courts and Congress grappled with the appropriateness of various remedies for de jure racial separation in the public schools, both North and South. Busing of school children created the greatest amount of controversy. Swann, of course, sanctioned an order requiring fairly extensive busing, as did the more recent Dayton and Columbus cases, but the earlier case cautioned as well that courts must observe limits occasioned by the nature of the educational process and the well-being of children, 1569 and subsequent cases declared the principle that the remedy must be no more extensive than the violation found. 1570 Congress has enacted several provisions of law, either permanent statutes or annual appropriations limits, that purport to restrict the power of federal courts and administrative agencies to order or to require busing, but these, either because of drafting infelicities or because of modifications required to obtain passage, have been VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00283 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 1954 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED 1571 E.g., § 407(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 248, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c–6, construed to cover only de facto segregation in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1971); § 803 of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 372, 20 U.S.C. § 1653 (expired), interpreted in Drummond v. Acree, 409 U.S. 1228 (1972) (Justice Powell in Chambers), and the Equal Educational Opportunities and Transportation of Students Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 514 (1974), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1757, see especially § 1714, interpreted in Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401, 411–15 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 995 (1976), and United States v. Texas Education Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 394 n.18 (5th Cir.), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); and a series of annual appropriations riders, first passed as riders to the 1976 and 1977 Labor-HEW bills, § 108, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976), and § 101, 91 Stat. 1460, 42 U.S.C.§ 2000d, upheld against facial attack in Brown v. Califano, 627 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 1572 See, e.g., The 14th Amendment and School Busing: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, 97th Congress, 1st Sess. (1981); and School Desegregation: Hearings Before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 97th Congress, 1st Sess. (1981). 1573 Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982). The decisions were in essence an application of Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). largely ineffectual. 1571 Stronger proposals, for statutes or for constitutional amendments, were introduced in Congress, but none passed both Houses. 1572 Of considerable importance to the possible validity of any substantial congressional restriction on judicial provision of remedies for de jure segregation violations are two decisions contrastingly dealing with referenda-approved restrictions on busing and other remedies in Washington State and California. 1573 Voters in Washington, following a decision by the school board in Seattle to undertake a mandatory busing program, approved an initiative that prohibited school boards from assigning students to any but the nearest or next nearest school that offered the students’ course of study; there were so many exceptions, however, that the prohibition in effect applied only to busing for racial purposes. In California the state courts had interpreted the state constitution to require school systems to eliminate both de jure and de facto segregation. The voters approved an initiative that prohibited state courts from ordering busing unless the segregation was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a federal judge would be empowered to order it under United States Supreme Court precedents. By a narrow division, the Court held unconstitutional the Washington measure, and with near unanimity of result if not of reasoning it sustained the California measure. The constitutional flaw in the Washington measure, the Court held, was that it had chosen a racial classification—busing for desegregation—and imposed more severe burdens upon those seeking to obtain such a policy than it imposed with respect to any other policy. Local school VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00284 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED 1955 1574 Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457, 470–82 (1982). Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court and was joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens. Dissenting were Justices Powell, Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Chief Justice Burger. Id. at 488. The dissent essentially argued that because the State was ultimately entirely responsible for all educational decisions, its choice to take back part of the power it had delegated did not raise the issues the majority thought it did. 1575 Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 535–40 (1982). 1576 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 1577 498 U.S. at 249-50. 1578 505 U.S. 717. boards could make education policy on anything but busing. By singling out busing and making it more difficult than anything else, the voters had expressly and knowingly enacted a law that had an intentional impact on a minority. 1574 The Court discerned no such impediment in the California measure, a simple repeal of a remedy that had been within the government’s discretion to provide. Moreover, the State continued under an obligation to alleviate de facto segregation by every other feasible means. The initiative had merely foreclosed one particular remedy—court-ordered mandatory busing—as inappropriate. 1575 Termination of Court Supervision.—With most school desegregation decrees having been entered decades ago, the issue arose as to what showing of compliance is necessary for a school district to free itself of continuing court supervision. The Court grappled with the issue, first in a case involving Oklahoma City public schools, then in a case involving the University of Mississippi college system. A desegregation decree may be lifted, the Court said in Oklahoma City Board of Education v. Dowell, 1576 upon a showing that the purposes of the litigation have been ‘‘fully achieved,’’—i.e., that the school district is being operated ‘‘in compliance with the commands of the Equal Protection Clause,’’ that it has been so operated ‘‘for a reasonable period of time,’’ and that it is ‘‘unlikely’’ that the school board would return to its former violations. On remand, the trial court was directed to determine ‘‘whether the Board had complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past [de jure] discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable.’’ 1577 In United States v. Fordice, 1578 the Court determined that the State of Mississippi had not, by adopting and implementing race-neutral policies, eliminated all vestiges of its prior de jure, racially segregated, ‘‘dual’’ system of higher education. The State must also, to the extent practicable and consistent with sound educational practices, eradicate policies and practices that are traceable to the dual system and that continue to have segregative effects. The Court identified several surviving aspects of Mis- VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00285 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 1956 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED 1579 100 U.S. 303 (1880). Cf. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880). Discrimination on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude in jury selection has also been statutorily illegal since enactment of § 4 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335, 18 U.S.C. § 243. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). In Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), the Court found jury discrimination against Mexican-Americans to be a denial of equal protection, a ruling it reiterated in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), finding proof of discrimination by statistical disparities, even though Mexican-surnamed individuals constituted a governing majority of the county and a majority of the selecting officials were Mexican- American. 1580 Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972). 1581 Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394 (1935); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953). 1582 Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 129 (1964); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 (1967); Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538 (1967). 1583 Even if there is no discrimination in the selection of the petit jury which convicted him, a defendant who shows discrimination in the selection of the grand jury which indicted him is entitled to a reversal of his conviction. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (habeas corpus remedy). sissippi’s prior dual system which are constitutionally suspect, and which must be justified or eliminated. The State’s admissions policy, requiring higher test scores for admission to the five historically white institutions than for admission to the three historically black institutions, is suspect because it originated as a means of preserving segregation. Also suspect are the widespread duplication of programs, a possible remnant of the dual ‘‘separate-but-equal’’ system; institutional mission classifications making three historically white schools the flagship ‘‘comprehensive’’ universities; and the retention and operation of all eight schools rather than the possible merger of some. Juries It has been established since Strauder v. West Virginia 1579 that exclusion of an identifiable racial or ethnic group from a grand jury 1580 which indicts a defendant or a petit jury 1581 which tries him, or from both, 1582 denies a defendant of the excluded race equal protection and necessitates reversal of his conviction or dismissal of his indictment. 1583 Even if the defendant’s race differs from that of the excluded jurors, the Court has recently held, the defendant has third party standing to assert the rights of jurors ex- VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00286 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED 1957 1584 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991). Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392 (1998) (grand jury). See also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (defendant entitled to have his conviction or indictment set aside if he proves such exclusion). The Court in 1972 was substantially divided with respect to the reason for rejecting the ‘‘same class’’ rule—that the defendant be of the excluded class—but in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), involving a male defendant and exclusion of women, the Court ascribed the result to the fair-cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment, which would have application across-the-board. 1585 Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970). 1586 Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970). 1587 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942). 1588 Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972). For an elaborate discussion of statistical proof, see Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). 1589 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Eubanks v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 360– 361 (1970). 1590 Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953) (names of whites and African Americans listed on differently colored paper for drawing for jury duty); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) (jurors selected from county tax books, in which names of African Americans were marked with a ‘‘c’’). 1591 Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 331–37 (1970), and cases cited. cluded on the basis of race. 1584 ‘‘Defendants in criminal proceedings do not have the only cognizable legal interest in nondiscriminatory jury selection. People excluded from juries because of their race are as much aggrieved as those indicted and tried by juries chosen under a system of racial exclusion.’’ 1585 Thus, persons may bring actions seeking affirmative relief to outlaw discrimination in jury selection, instead of depending on defendants to raise the issue. 1586 A prima facie case of deliberate and systematic exclusion is made when it is shown that no African Americans have served on juries for a period of years 1587 or when it is shown that the number of African Americans who served was grossly disproportionate to the percentage of African Americans in the population and eligible for jury service. 1588 Once this prima facie showing has been made, the burden is upon the jurisdiction to prove that discrimination was not practiced; it is not adequate that jury selection officials testify under oath that they did not discriminate. 1589 Although the Court in connection with a showing of great disparities in the racial makeup of jurors called has voided certain practices which made discrimination easy to accomplish, 1590 it has not outlawed discretionary selection pursuant to general standards of educational attainment and character which can be administered fairly. 1591 Similarly, it declined to rule that African Americans must VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00287 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 1958 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED 1592 396 U.S. at 340-41. 1593 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 1594 476 U.S. 79, 96, 98 (1986). The principles were applied in Trevino v. Texas, 503 U.S. 562 (1991), holding that a criminal defendant’s allegation of a state’s pattern of historical and habitual use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of racial minorities was sufficient to raise an equal protection claim under Swain as well as Batson. In Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), a prosecutor was held to have sustained his burden of providing a race-neutral explanation for using peremptory challenges to strike bilingual Latino jurors; the prosecutor had explained that, based on the answers and demeanor of the prospective jurors, he had doubted whether they would accept the interpreter’s official translation of trial testimony by Spanish-speaking witnesses. The Batson ruling applies to cases pending on direct review or not yet final when Batson was decided, Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), but does not apply to a case on federal habeas corpus review, Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986). 1595 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614. 1596 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992). be included on all-white jury commissions which administer the jury selection laws in some States. 1592 In Swain v. Alabama, 1593 African Americans regularly appeared on jury venires but no African American had actually served on a jury. It appeared that the absence was attributable to the action of the prosecutor in peremptorily challenging all potential African American jurors, but the Court refused to set aside the conviction. The use of peremptory challenges to exclude the African Americans in the particular case was permissible, the Court held, regardless of the prosecutor’s motive, although it was indicated the consistent use of such challenges to remove African Americans would be unconstitutional. Because the record did not disclose that the prosecution was responsible solely for the fact that no African American had ever served on a jury and that some exclusions were not the result of defense peremptory challenges, defendant’s claims were rejected. The Swain holding as to the evidentiary standard was overruled in Batson v. Kentucky, the Court ruling that ‘‘a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful [racial] discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s [own] trial.’’ To rebut this showing, the prosecutor ‘‘must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case,’’ but the explanation ‘‘need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.’’ 1594 The Court has also extended Batson to apply to racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by private litigants in civil litigation, 1595 and by a defendant in a criminal case, 1596 the principal issue in these cases being the presence of state action, not the invalidity of purposeful racial discrimination. VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00288 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED 1959 1597 Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 551 n.4 (1979). 1598 Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339 (1984). Note also that in this limited context where injury to the defendant was largely conjectural, the Court seemingly revived the same class rule, holding that a white defendant challenging on due process grounds exclusion of blacks as grand jury foremen could not rely on equal protection principles protecting blacks defendants from ‘‘the injuries of stigmatization and prejudice’’ associated with discrimination. Id. at 347. 1599 481 U.S. 279 (1987). The decision was 5–4, with Justice Powell’s opinion of the Court being joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justices White, O’Connor, and Scalia, and with Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, and Marshall dissenting. 1600 481 U.S. at 294. Dissenting Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens challenged this position as inconsistent with the Court’s usual approach to capital punishment, in which greater scrutiny is required. Id. at 340, 347–48, 366. 1601 481 U.S. at 297. Discretion is especially important to the role of a capital sentencing jury, which must be allowed to consider any mitigating factor relating to the defendant’s background or character, or to the nature of the offense; the Court also cited the ‘‘traditionally ‘wide discretion’’’ accorded decisions of prosecutors. Id. at 296. Discrimination in the selection of grand jury foremen presents a closer question, answer to which depends in part on the responsibilities of a foreman in the particular system challenged. Thus the Court had ‘‘assumed without deciding’’ that discrimination in selection of foremen for state grand juries would violate equal protection in a system in which the judge selected a foreman to serve as a thirteenth voting juror, and that foreman exercised significant powers. 1597 That situation was distinguished, however, in a due process challenge to the federal system, where the foreman’s responsibilities are ‘‘essentially clerical’’ and where the selection is from among the members of an already-chosen jury. 1598 Capital Punishment In McCleskey v. Kemp 1599 the Court rejected an equal protection claim of a black defendant who received a death sentence following conviction for murder of a white victim, even though a statistical study showed that blacks charged with murdering whites were more than four times as likely to receive a death sentence in the state than were defendants charged with killing blacks. The Court distinguished Batson v. Kentucky by characterizing capital sentencing as ‘‘fundamentally different’’ from jury venire selection; consequently, reliance on statistical proof of discrimination is less rather than more appropriate. 1600 ‘‘Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been abused.’’ 1601 Also, the Court noted, there is not the same opportunity to rebut a statistical inference of discrimination; jurors may VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00289 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 1960 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED 1602 The Court distinguished Batson by suggesting that the death penalty challenge would require a prosecutor ‘‘to rebut a study that analyzes the past conduct of scores of prosecutors’’ whereas the peremptory challenge inquiry would focus only on the prosecutor’s own acts. 481 U.S. at 296 n.17. 1603 245 U.S. 60 (1917). See also Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927); Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930). 1604 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). Cf. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926). 1605 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 1606 James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). The Court did not perceive that either on its face or as applied the provision was other than racially neutral. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun dissented. Id. at 143. 1607 Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 73, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. 1608 See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). 1609 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). not be required to testify as to their motives, and for the most part prosecutors are similarly immune from inquiry. 1602 Housing Buchanan v. Warley 1603 invalidated an ordinance which prohibited blacks from occupying houses in blocks where the greater number of houses were occupied by whites and which prohibited whites from doing so where the greater number of houses were occupied by blacks. Although racially restrictive covenants do not themselves violate the equal protection clause, the judicial enforcement of them, either by injunctive relief or through entertaining damage actions, does violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 1604 Referendum passage of a constitutional amendment repealing a ‘‘fair housing’’ law and prohibiting further state or local action in that direction was held unconstitutional in Reitman v. Mulkey, 1605 though on somewhat ambiguous grounds, while a state constitutional requirement that decisions of local authorities to build lowrent housing projects in an area must first be submitted to referendum, although other similar decisions were not so limited, was found to accord with the equal protection clause. 1606 Private racial discrimination in the sale or rental of housing is subject to two federal laws prohibiting most such discrimination. 1607 Provision of publicly assisted housing, of course, must be on a nondiscriminatory basis. 1608 Other Areas of Discrimination Transportation.—The ‘‘separate but equal’’ doctrine won Supreme Court endorsement in the transportation context, 1609 and its passing in the education field did not long predate its demise in VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00290 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED 1961 1610 Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), aff’g, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.) (statute requiring segregation on buses is unconstitutional). ‘‘We have settled beyond question that no State may require racial segregation of interstate transportation facilities. . . . This question is no longer open; it is foreclosed as a litigable issue.’’ Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962). 1611 McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914). 1612 Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941). 1613 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950). 1614 364 U.S. 454 (1960). 1615 E.g., Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches and bathhouses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (municipal golf courses); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass’n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (city lease of park facilities); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (public parks and golf courses); State Athletic Comm’n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (statute requiring segregated athletic contests); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (administrative regulation requiring segregation in airport restaurant); Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (ordinance requiring segregation in municipal auditorium). 1616 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). State courts had removed the city as trustee but the Court thought the city w

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