Online Attorney

ral choice but the judiciary is unable to determine what level of quality would be sufficient. Moreover, the system under attack did not deny educational opportunity to any child, whatever the result in that case might be; it was attacked for providing relative differences in VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00361 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 2032 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED 1929 411 U.S. at 29-39. But see id. at 62 (Justice Brennan dissenting), 70, 110– 17 (Justices Marshall and Douglas dissenting). 1930 Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). The case is also noted for its proposition that there were only two equal protection standards of review, a proposition even the author of the opinion has now abandoned. 1931 487 U.S. 450 (1988). This was a 5–4 decision, with Justice O’Connor’s opinion of the Court being joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy, and with Justices Marshall, Brennan, Stevens, and Blackmun dissenting. 1932 487 U.S. at 462. The plaintiff child nonetheless continued to attend school, so the requirement was reviewed as an additional burden but not a complete obstacle to her education. 1933 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 1934 432 U.S. at 470-71. spending and those differences could not be correlated with differences in educational quality. 1929 Rodriguez clearly promised judicial restraint in evaluating challenges to the provision of governmental benefits when the effect is relatively different because of the wealth of some of the recipients or potential recipients and when the results, what is obtained, vary in relative degrees. Wealth or indigency is not a per se suspect classification but it must be related to some interest that is fundamental, and Rodriguez doctrinally imposed a considerable barrier to the discovery or creation of additional fundamental interests. As the decisions reviewed earlier with respect to marriage and the family reveal, that barrier has not held entirely firm, but within a range of interests, such as education, 1930 the case remains strongly viable. Relying on Rodriguez and distinguishing Plyler, the Court in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools 1931 rejected an indigent student’s equal protection challenge to a state statute permitting school districts to charge a fee for school bus service, in the process rejecting arguments that either ‘‘strict’’ or ‘‘heightened’’ scrutiny is appropriate. Moreover, the Court concluded, there is no constitutional obligation to provide bus transportation, or to provide it for free if it is provided at all. 1932 Abortion.—Rodriguez furnished the principal analytical basis for the Court’s subsequent decision in Maher v. Roe, 1933 holding that a State’s refusal to provide public assistance for abortions that were not medically necessary under a program that subsidized all medical expenses otherwise associated with pregnancy and childbirth did not deny to indigent pregnant women equal protection of the laws. As in Rodriguez, it was held that the indigent are not a suspect class. 1934 Again, as in Rodriguez and in Kras, it was held that when the State has not monopolized the avenues for relief and the burden is only relative rather than absolute, a governmental failure to offer assistance, while funding alternative actions, is not VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00362 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED 2033 1935 432 U.S. at 471-74. See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322–23 (1980). Total deprivation was the theme of Boddie and was the basis of concurrences by Justices Stewart and Powell in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 391, 396 (1978), in that the State imposed a condition indigents could not meet and made no exception for them. The case also emphasized that Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), imposed a rational basis standard in equal protection challenges to social welfare cases. But see Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), where the majority rejected the dissent’s argument that this should always be the same. undue governmental interference with a fundamental right. 1935 Expansion of this area of the law of equal protection seems especially limited. SECTION 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. APPORTIONMENT OF REPRESENTATION With the abolition of slavery by the Thirteenth Amendment, the African Americans formerly counted as three-fifths of persons would be fully counted in the apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives, increasing as well the electoral vote, there appeared the prospect that politically the readmitted Southern States would gain the advantage in Congress when combined with Democrats from the North. Inasmuch as the South was adamantly opposed to African American suffrage, all the congressmen would be elected by whites. Many wished to provide for the enfranchisement of the African American and proposals to this effect were voted on in both the House and the Senate, but only a few Northern States VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00363 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 2034 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED 1936 See generally J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1956). 1937 Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 870 (1946). 1938 The section did furnish a basis to Justice Harlan to argue that inasmuch as § 2 recognized a privilege to discriminate subject only to the penalty provided, the Court was in error in applying § 1 to questions relating to the franchise. Compare Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 152 (1970) (Justice Harlan concurring and dissenting), with id. at 229, 250 (Justice Brennan concurring and dissenting). The language of the section recognizing 21 as the usual minimum voting age no doubt played some part in the Court’s decision in Oregon v. Mitchell as well. It should also be noted that the provision relating to ‘‘Indians not taxed’’ is apparently obsolete now in light of an Attorney General ruling that all Indians are subject to taxation. 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 518 (1940). 1939 418 U.S. 24 (1974). Justices Marshall, Douglas, and Brennan dissented. Id. at 56, 86. permitted African Americans to vote and a series of referenda on the question in Northern States revealed substantial white hostility to the proposal. Therefore, a compromise was worked out, to effect a reduction in the representation of any State which discriminated against males in the franchise. 1936 No serious effort was ever made in Congress to effectuate § 2, and the only judicial attempt was rebuffed. 1937 With subsequent constitutional amendments adopted and the utilization of federal coercive powers to enfranchise persons, the section is little more than an historical curiosity. 1938 However, in Richardson v. Ramirez, 1939 the Court relied upon the implied approval of disqualification upon conviction of crime to uphold a state law disqualifying convicted felons for the franchise even after the service of their terms. It declined to assess the state interests involved and to evaluate the necessity of the rule, holding rather that because of § 2 the equal protection clause was simply inapplicable. SECTIONS 3 AND 4. No Person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00364 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED 2035 1940 E.g., and notably, the Private Act of December 14, 1869, ch.1, 16 Stat. 607. 1941 Ch. 193, 17 Stat. 142. 1942 Act of June 6, 1898, ch. 389, 30 Stat. 432. Legislation by Congress providing for removal was necessary to give effect to the prohibition of § 3, and until removed in pursuance of such legislation persons in office before promulgation of the Fourteenth Amendment continued to exercise their functions lawfully. Griffin’s Case, 11 Fed. Cas. 7 (C.C.D.Va. 1869) (No. 5815). Nor were persons who had taken part in the Civil War and had been pardoned by the President before the adoption of this Amendment precluded by this section from again holding office under the United States. 18 Op. Att’y Gen. 149 (1885). On the construction of ‘‘engaged in rebellion,’’ see United States v. Powell, 27 Fed. Cas. 605 (C.C.D.N.C. 1871) (No. 16,079). 1943 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 354 (1935), in which the Court concluded that the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, insofar as it attempted to override the gold-clause obligation in a Fourth Liberty Loan Gold Bond ‘‘went beyond the thereof. But congress may by a vote of two thirds of each House, remove such disability. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. DISQUALIFICATION AND PUBLIC DEBT The right to remove disabilities imposed by this section was exercised by Congress at different times on behalf of enumerated individuals. 1940 In 1872, the disabilities were removed, by a blanket act, from all persons ‘‘except Senators and Representatives of the Thirty-sixth and Thirty-seventh Congresses, officers in the judicial, military and naval service of the United States, heads of departments, and foreign ministers of the United States.’’ 1941 Twenty-six years later, Congress enacted that ‘‘the disability imposed by section 3 . . . incurred heretofore, is hereby removed.’’ 1942 Although § 4 ‘‘was undoubtedly inspired by the desire to put beyond question the obligations of the Government issued during the Civil War, its language indicates a broader connotation. . . . ‘[T]he validity of the public debt’. . . [embraces] whatever concerns the integrity of the public obligations,’’ and applies to government bonds issued after as well as before adoption of the Amendment. 1943 VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00365 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 2036 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED congressional power.’’ On a Confederate bond problem, see Branch v. Haas, 16 F. 53 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1883) (citing Hanauer v. Woodruff, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 439 (1873), and Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 1 (1869)). See also The Pietro Campanella, 73 F. Supp. 18 (D. Md. 1947). 1944 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; Act of February 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433; the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13; Civil Rights Act of 1875; 18 Stat. 335. The modern provisions surviving of these statutes are 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 42 U.S.C.§§ 1981–83, 1985–1986, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Two lesser statutes were the Slave Kidnapping Act of 1866, ch. 86, 14 Stat. 50, and the Peonage Abolition Act, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–88, and 42 U.S.C.§ 1994. 1945 See generally R. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD (1947). 1946 For cases under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 in their previous codifications, see United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917); United States v. Bathgate, 246 U.S. 220 (1918); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920). The resurgence of the use of these statutes began with United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), and Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). 1947 The 1957 and 1960 Acts primarily concerned voting; the public accommodations provisions of the 1964 Act and the housing provisions of the 1968 Act were premised on the commerce power. 1948 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). The development of congressional enforcement powers in these cases was paralleled by a similar expansion of the enforcement powers of Congress with regard to the Thirteenth Amendment, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). SECTION 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. ENFORCEMENT Generally In the aftermath of the Civil War, Congress, in addition to proposing to the States the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, enacted seven statutes designed in a variety of ways to implement the provisions of these Amendments. 1944 Several of these laws were general civil rights statutes which broadly attacked racial and other discrimination on the part of private individuals and groups as well as by the States, but the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional or rendered ineffective practically all of these laws over the course of several years. 1945 In the end, Reconstruction was abandoned and with rare exceptions no cases were brought under the remaining statutes until fairly recently. 1946 Beginning with the Civil Rights Act of 1957, however, Congress generally acted pursuant to its powers under the commerce clause 1947 until Supreme Court decisions indicated an expansive concept of congressional power under the Civil War Amendments, 1948 which culminated in broad provisions against private in- VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00366 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED 2037 1949 82 Stat. 73, 18 U.S.C. § 245. The statute has yet to receive its constitutional testing. 1950 On the ‘‘state action’’ doctrine in the context of the direct application of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see discussion supra. 1951 529 U.S. 528, 617-27 (2000). 1952 Pub. L. No. 103–322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1941, 42 U.S.C. § 13981. 1953 529 U.S. at 621 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948), for the proposition that the Amendment ‘‘erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful’’). 1954 This holding may have broader significance for federal civil rights law. For instance, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (a civil statute paralleling the criminal statute held unconstitutional in United States v. Harris) lacks a ‘‘color of law’’ requirement. Although the requirement was read into it in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), to avoid constitutional problems, it was read out again in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971) (while it might be ‘‘difficult to conceive of what might constitute a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws by private persons . . . there is nothing inherent in the phrase that requires the action working the deprivation to come from the State’’). What the unanimous Court held in Griffin was that an ‘‘intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.’’ Id. at 102. As so construed, the statute was held constitutional as applied in the complaint before the Court on the basis of the Thirteenth Amendment and the right to travel; there was no necessity therefore, to consider Congress’ powers under § 5 of the 14th Amendment. Id. at 107. terference with civil rights in the 1968 legislation. 1949 The story of these years is largely an account of the ‘‘state action’’ doctrine in terms of its limitation on congressional powers; 1950 lately, it is the still-unfolding history of the lessening of the doctrine combined with a judicial vesting of discretion in Congress to reinterpret the scope and content of the rights guaranteed in these three constitutional amendments. The Court, however, ultimately rejected this expansion of the powers of Congress in United States v. Morrison. 1951 In Morrison, the Court invalidated a provision of the Violence Against Women Act 1952 that established a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence. The case involved a university student who brought a civil action against other students who allegedly raped her. The argument was made that there was a pervasive bias against victims of gender-motivated violence in state justice systems, and that the federal remedy would offset and deter this bias. The Court first reaffirmed the state action requirement for legislation passed under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1953 dismissing the dicta in Guest, and reaffirming the precedents of the Civil Rights Cases and United States v. Harris. The Court also rejected the assertion that the legislation was ‘‘corrective’’ of bias in the courts, as the suits are not directed at the State or any state actor, but rather at the individuals committing the criminal acts. 1954 VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00367 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 2038 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED The lower courts have been quite divided with respect to what constitutes a non-racial, class-based animus, and what constitutional protections must be threatened before a private conspiracy can be reached under § 1985(3). See, e.g., Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972); Great American Fed. S. & L. Ass’n v. Novotny, 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc), rev’d, 442 U.S. 366 (1979); Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc). The Court’s decision in Morrison, however, appears to preclude the use of § 1985(3) in relation to Fourteenth Amendment rights absent some state action. 1955 Section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, 28 U.S.C. § 1443. See Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). The statute is of limited utility because of the interpretation placed on it almost from the beginning. Compare Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966), with City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966). 1956 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); United States v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 563 (1968). 1957 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), construed in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). 1958 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). 1959 United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966). 1960 Both 18 U.S.C. § 242 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contain language restricting application to deprivations under color of state law, whereas 18 U.S.C. § 241 lacks such language. The newest statute, 18 U.S.C. § 245, contains, of course, no such language. On the meaning of ‘‘custom’’ as used in the ‘‘under color of’’ phrase, see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). 1961 E.g., the problem of ‘‘specific intent’’ in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), and Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951), and the problem of what ‘‘right or privilege’’ is ‘‘secured’’ to a person by the Constitution and laws of the United States, which divided the Court in United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951), and which was resolved in United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966). 1962 18 Stat. 335, §§ 1, 2. State Action In enforcing by appropriate legislation the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees against state denials, Congress has the discretion to adopt remedial measures, such as authorizing persons being denied their civil rights in state courts to remove their cases to federal courts, 1955 and to provide criminal 1956 and civil 1957 liability for state officials and agents 1958 or persons associated with them 1959 who violate protected rights. These statutory measures designed to eliminate discrimination ‘‘under color of law’’ 1960 present no problems of constitutional foundation, although there may well be other problems of application. 1961 But the Reconstruction Congresses did not stop with statutory implementation of rights guaranteed against state infringement, moving as well against private interference. Thus, in the Civil Rights Act of 1875 1962 Congress had proscribed private racial discrimination in the admission to and use of inns, public conveyances, theaters, and other places of public VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00368 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED 2039 1963 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Court also rejected the Thirteenth Amendment foundation for the statute, a foundation revived by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 1964 109 U.S. at 11. Justice Harlan’s dissent reasoned that Congress had the power to protect rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment against invasion by both state and private action, but also viewed places of public accommodation as serving a quasi-public function which satisfied the state action requirement in any event. Id. at 46–48, 56–57. 1965 92 U.S. 542 (1876). The action was pursuant to § 6 of the 1870 Enforcement Act, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, the predecessor of 18 U.S.C. § 241. 1966 106 U.S. 629 (1883). The case held unconstitutional a provision of § 2 of the 1871 Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. 1967 See also Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920). Under the Fifteenth Amendment, see James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903). 1968 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552–53, 556 (1876). The rights which the Court assumed the United States could protect against private interference were the right to petition Congress for a redress of grievances and the right to vote free of interference on racial grounds in a federal election. 1969 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 1970 Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892). amusement. The Civil Rights Cases 1963 found this enactment to be beyond Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. It was observed that § 1 was prohibitory only upon the States and did not reach private conduct. Therefore, Congress’ power under § 5 to enforce § 1 by appropriate legislation was held to be similarly limited. ‘‘It does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of State legislation; but to provide modes of relief against State legislation, or State action, of the kind referred to. It does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the operation of State laws, and the action of State officers executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the amendment.’’ 1964 The holding in this case had already been preceded by United States v. Cruikshank 1965 and by United States v. Harris 1966 in which the Federal Government had prosecuted individuals for killing and injuring African Americans. The Amendment did not increase the power of the Federal Government vis-a-vis individuals, the Court held, only with regard to the States themselves. 1967 Cruikshank did, however, recognize a small category of federal rights which Congress could protect against private deprivation, rights which the Court viewed as deriving particularly from one’s status as a citizen of the United States and which Congress had a general police power to protect. 1968 These rights included the right to vote in federal elections, general and primary, 1969 the right to federal protection while in the custody of federal officers, 1970 and VerDate Jul<13>2004 05:44 Jul 13, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00369 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 \\GSDDPC41\YOURS-AND-MINE\CON046.SGM CON046 2040 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED 1971 In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895). See also United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884) (right to homestead). 1972 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). 1973 341 U.S. 70 (1951). 1974 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (due process clause). 1975 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (equal protection clause). 1976 Justice Brennan’s opinion, 383 U.S. at 774, was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas. His statement that ‘‘[a] majority of the members of the Court expresses the view today that § 5 empowers Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies to interfere with the exercise of Fourteenth Amendment rights, whether or not state officers or others acting under the color of state law are implicated in the conspiracy,’’ id. at 782 (emphasis by the Justice), was based upon the language of Justice Clark, joined by Justices Black and Fortas, id. at 761, that inasmuch as Justice Brennan reach

Online Attorney